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This article documents the persistent mis-representation and mis-understanding of the most ubiquitous 
forensic science of the past century. That is, the treatment of latent fingerprint evidence as categorical 
identification of a specific person. Following a review of the manner in which latent fingerprint evidence 
was presented in trials and appeals, starting at the beginning of the twentieth century and continuing until 
the present, it introduces scientific research and advice. This juxtaposition allows us to observe how New 
Zealand’s legal institutions have not required fingerprint examiners to temper their claims in response to 
mainstream scientific research and advice (emerging largely out of the US and UK). In conclusion, drawing 
upon scientific recommendations, the article explains what is required to make the claims of latent 
fingerprint examiners scientifically grounded such that their probative opinions can be evaluated in ways 
that facilitate the goals of rectitude and fairness. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
From the first occasion when fingerprint evidence was reported in a judgment until the 
present day, New Zealand’s fingerprint examiners have presented their opinions as 
categorical evidence of identification.1 They equated decisions about two prints matching 
with the identification of a specific person without qualification or caveat. On the rare 
occasion when the accuracy of an opinion was questioned examiners invoked the 
uniqueness of fingerprints and the infallibility of their ‘method’, sometimes in 
conjunction with training and experience, to support error-free performance. Today, 
fingerprint examiners continue to identify latent prints in categorical terms.2 Trial and 
appellate courts continue to admit and endorse these categorical claims. When fingerprint 
evidence is adduced courts frequently expect defendants to provide an explanation for 
their presence or their touch. Drawing upon scientific research and advice, this article 
questions these conventional approaches. It explains how equating a match decision with 
categorical identification overstates the value of opinions in ways that appear inconsistent 
with actual abilities as well as fundamentals of the accusatorial trial.  
 This article examines judicial decisions. While it does not purport to capture all of the 
nuances of the more detailed challenges and qualifications encountered in criminal 
proceedings across the previous 120 years, it does document how lawyers and courts 
represented and understood latent fingerprint evidence.3 There are few, if any, decisions 
that modify or qualify the reception of fingerprint evidence as categorical identification.4 
 
† Professor, School of Law, UNSW; Research Professor (fractional), School of Law, Northumbria University; Chair, 
Evidence-based Forensics Initiative. Thanks to Andrew Ligertwood, Julia Tolmie, Elizabeth McDonald, David Hamer 
and Emma Cunliffe. 
1 The terms categorical identification, positive identification and individualisation are used synonymously. They 
all imply that the decision about two fingerprints matching represents the identification of a specific person. 
2 Technically, latent prints are prints produced by friction ridge skin (from the fingers, palm and feet) that are 
deposited on a thing and are not readily visible to the naked eye. These are often exposed through the use of 
powders and other methods involving chemicals and lighting. The term ‘latent print’ conventionally includes all 
crime scene prints and this includes those that are visible, such as fingermarks in blood. 
3 An account of challenges in New Zealand courts is the subject of a separate article: ‘Fingerprint evidence in New 
Zealand’s courts: A history of legal challenges’ (2020) New Zealand Universities Law Review (forthcoming). 
4 Examiners occasionally report and even testify that no prints were recovered, that the recovered prints were 
insufficient for comparison, or that the defendant could not be excluded. This article is concerned with the more 
familiar use of fingerprints as positive evidence of identity. 
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There does not seem to be a single instance of a lawyer or a judge describing fingerprint 
evidence in a way that is consistent with relevant scientific research and advice.5 
 The following account begins with an examination of the treatment of latent 
fingerprint evidence in the first reported decisions, where New Zealand’s judges lent their 
institutional imprimatur in remarkably strong terms. Section 3 reviews the way latent 
fingerprint evidence was subsequently presented and understood as unequivocal evidence 
of identity across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Section 4 illustrates how even 
the most elaborate challenges to the accuracy of latent fingerprint evidence did not lead 
courts to re-consider their conventional commitments. Then, turning to scientific research 
and mainstream scientific interventions, Section 5 confronts the reader with 
contemporary scientific perspectives on latent fingerprint comparison, including the 
results of the first validation studies beginning in 2009. As we shall see, reviews by pre-
eminent scientific organisations present latent fingerprint comparison in ways that are 
irreconcilable with its presentation in New Zealand’s courtrooms and case law. Drawing 
on this scientific research and derivative recommendations, the article closes with advice 
on how fingerprint evidence should be presented in reports and testimony, and what 
courts should require before the opinions of latent fingerprint examiners are admitted in 
criminal proceedings. 
 This account reveals a century of overstatement and misunderstanding under the 
oversight of prosecutors and judges.6 Inexorably, it implicates legal institutions.7 For, 
admission and reliance made substantial contributions to the socio-legal status of 
fingerprint evidence as practically infallible evidence of identity. Lawyers, judges and 
courts conferred legitimacy but without meaningful epistemological engagement. They 
never asked: Can you do it, how well, and how do we know?8 
 
 
2. EARLY REPORTS OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
There are many references to fingerprint evidence in New Zealand courts following its 
introduction in the first decade of the twentieth century.9 This section reviews the first 
three reported cases – Rex v Clancy, Rex v Krausch and The King v Gunn.10 
 The first ‘report’ of fingerprint evidence appears in Rex v Clancy in 1905.11 Clancy 
was indicted for breaking, entering and theft before Chief Justice Stout in Wellington. 
 
5 This is largely consistent with practices in other common law jurisdictions. For Australia, see Gary Edmond, 
‘Latent science: A history of challenges to fingerprint evidence in Australia’ (2019) 38 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 301, and for England and Wales, consider Gary Edmond, Emma Cunliffe and David Hamer, 
‘Fingerprint comparison and adversarialism: The scientific and historical evidence’ (2020) 83 Modern Law 
Review (forthcoming). 
6 Though, note Susan Glazebrook, ‘Miscarriage by expert’ (2018) 49 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 
245 and in Australia, Chris Maxwell, ‘Preventing Miscarriages of Justice: The Reliability of Forensic Evidence 
and the Role of the Trial Judge as Gatekeeper’ (2019) 93 Australian Law Journal 642. 
7 This might be characterised as legal ‘worldmaking’ or ‘co-production’, see Nelson Goodman, Ways of 
Worldmaking (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1978) and Sheila Jasanoff (ed.), States of knowledge: The coproduction of 
science and social order  (London, Routledge, 2004). 
8 See Kristy Martire and Gary Edmond, ‘Rethinking Expert Opinion Evidence’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University 
Law Review 967. 
9 Trials were often reported in contemporary newspapers, available at <https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers>. 
On the history of latent fingerprint comparison, more generally, see Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of 
Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001); Chandak Seengoopta, 
Imprint of the Raj: How Fingerprinting was Born in Colonial India (London, PanMacMillan, 2003); Colin Beavan, 
Fingerprints: The Origins of Crime Detection and the Murder Case that Launched Forensic Science (London, 
Hyperion, 2001). 
10 Rex v Clancy, Circular No 15, 1905; Rex v Krausch (1913) 32 NZLR 1229; R v Gunn - Jury Instructions re 
fingerprint evidence [1920] NZPoliceLawRp 1; (1920) 2 New Zealand Police Law Reports (Supplement) i (28 May 
1920). 
11 Rex v Clancy, Circular No 15, 1905. Reproduced in the Police Law Reports as an appendix to Gunn. 
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The Crown relied on fingerprint evidence recovered from a broken window. Newspapers 
reported Clancy as the first fingerprint-only prosecution.12 The short report of the case 
explains: 
 
At the Supreme Court the Finger-print Branch experts proved positively that the print on the glass 
was identical with that of Clancy’s third right finger, and must have been made by him. Lengthy 
cross-examination failed to shake that evidence in the slightest degree.  
On this evidence alone prisoner was found guilty and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with 
hard labour.13 
 
A fingerprint recovered from the outside of a window is identified to Clancy without 
qualification – the latent print ‘must have been made by him.’ The evidence was admitted 
and Clancy was convicted.14 The trial is implicitly fair, the evidence reliable and the 
verdict sound, because the defendant is legally represented and cross-examination could 
not ‘shake’ the fingerprint evidence ‘in the slightest degree’.  
 The next legal report of fingerprint evidence arises out of Rex v Krausch.15 The New 
Zealand Law Reports reproduce Justice Chapman’s charge to the jury in a prosecution 
again concerned with breaking and entering. Along with the fingerprint examiner’s 
opinion, that Krausch was the offender based on ‘fifteen points of resemblance’, the jury 
was presented with ‘enlarged photographs’ of the prints and invited to make its own 
comparison.16 
 In his address, Chapman J assured the jury about the scientific foundations of the 
fingerprint evidence: 
 
So many of these cases have now been tried in this Court, and reference has so often been made to 
expert testimony and books of authority on this subject, that the leading facts of it may well be taken 
to be established scientific facts. Under the law of this country a Judge may in scientific matters 
refer to such books as he may consider to be of authority on the subjects to which they relate. I have 
referred so often to these matters that I now know what the books have to say on the subject, just as 
most of us know the main facts about a limited number of poisonous substances and other facts 
which formerly had to be proved by expert witness. The leading facts respecting finger-markings 
such as have been proved in this case may be regarded as established biological facts.17 
 
There are many references to ‘facts’ and extensive legal use, but no actual references to 
scientific materials.18 All this seems intended to reinforce the extreme improbability of 
finding matching prints from a source other than the defendant. 
 Defence counsel’s attempt to introduce ‘authority’ from Australia, namely the dissent 
of the Chief Justice of Victoria in R v Parker (1912), stimulated a critical rejoinder.19  
 
12 Upon committal, the Waikato Times reported the ‘experts’ locating 21 points of similarity between the prints and 
declaiming that ‘the chances against the marks on the glass having been made by any other finger than Clancy’s are 
over two thousand billion to one.’ See ‘The finger print system’, Waikato Times, 7 March 1905; ‘Traced by a finger 
print. An interesting case’, Manawatu Times, 7 March 1905. On quantification, see Francis Galton, Fingerprints 
(London, MacMillan & Co, 1892). 
13 Supplement to Police Reports, 1920, 11. 
14 There is no reference to any legislative scheme for the collection of samples. 
15 Rex v Krausch (1913) 32 NZLR 1229. 
16 Krausch, 1230. Fingerprint evidence may have helped to reduce forms of racial discrimination in some 
investigations: see also R v Blacker [1910] SR (NSW) 357. 
17 Krausch, 1230. (italics added) 
18 Krausch, 1231. Notwithstanding the fingerprint examiner’s categorical identification, the judge introduces the 
language of ‘odds’ and embarks on a series of probabilistic analogies. The analogies are reminiscent of People v 
Collins 68 Cal. 2d 319 (1968); see Lawrence Tribe, ‘Trial by mathematics’ (1971) 84 Harvard Law Review 1329. 
19 R v Parker [1912] VR 152. See Edmond, ‘Latent science’; Jeremy Gans, ‘A Tale of Two High Court Forensic Cases’ 
(2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 515.  
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Against Madden CJ’s questioning of the value of untested opinion, Chapman J 
counterposes the collective experience of the New Zealand judiciary:  
 
… all of the Judges of this Court who have had anything to do with cases in which this class of 
evidence has been brought forward have emphatically expressed opinions at variance with that of 
that eminent Judge.20 
 
 The approach from Krausch was followed in The King v Gunn. Gunn was on trial for 
murder, again before Chapman J, in the first capital case dependent on fingerprint 
evidence. The Post Master had been shot dead and his keys were taken to obtain access to 
the post office. The main evidence was identification by latent fingerprints recovered 





THE CLINCHING PROOFS OF CRIMINAL GUILT.—FINGER PRINTS OF DENNIS GUNN, THE 
PONSONBY MURDERER 
The conviction of Dennis Gunn as the murderer of Mr Braithwaite, the postmaster at Ponsonby, Auckland, is held 
to be a complete vindication of the value of finger-print evidence. Prints were found on a cashbox at the Post 
Office where the crime was committed, and also on a revolver found near Gunn’s home. The print on the left is a 
reproduction of that which was found on the cashbox; that on the right is the official print taken after Gunn’s 
arrest. There were forty points of identification when the two were compared.22 
 
Figure 1: One of the fingerprints used to identify Gunn. 
 
 Justice Chapman’s ‘address to the jury’ was again published, this time in the Police 
Law Reports. Characterising his role as offering ‘assistance’, Chapman J explained:23 
 
The Crown claims that the police have found in the building itself, on the cash-boxes, unmistakable 
evidence left there by the accused, as certain in their effect as if he had left his signature. That is the 
case for the Crown, and that is the case you are asked to act upon. I need hardly point out to you that 
if that is made out to your satisfaction, then you are offered a stronger case than in many instances 
has been deemed to be sufficient. The case for the Crown presented to you by finger-print evidence 
 
20 Gazette Law Report, 665. 
21 Gunn, x.  
22 ‘The clinching proofs of criminal guilt’, Free Lance, Volume XIX, Issue 1043, 23 June 1920; ‘The Evidence That 
Convicted Dennis Gunn’, Observer, Volume Xl, Issue 40, 5 June 1920. Available at: 
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/fingerprintshelpconvictmurderer. 
23 Gunn, ii.  
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is that the marks of identification on prints—of which, at any rate, three are identified—are so 
numerous and so strong, and their general character and value is so great, that one inference only is 
left ... It is for you to test the validity of that argument.24  
 
The relatively greater evidentiary value of multiple fingerprints is an important issue that 
is often inadequately addressed (see Section 5.C), perhaps because of pervasive beliefs 
about the ability to achieve error-free (or ‘unmistakable’) identification based on a single 
latent print.25 
 As for defence ‘challenges’ to the fingerprint evidence: 
 
Counsel for the defence complains that that is expert evidence, and that the prisoner has no 
evidence to contradict it. So far as we know the history of finger-printing, that complaint might have 
been made at any time during these seventeen years. In my very long experience on this Bench no 
one has hitherto produced a conflict of evidence on the subject. So far as the witnesses are able to 
inform you of the history of the last seventeen years, and so far as the views of other Judges are 
concerned, no conflict of evidence has ever been heard of.26  
 
Bizarre to modern eyes, the defence complaint draws attention to the state’s monopoly on 
fingerprint comparison and the apparent inability to challenge this definitive evidence. It 
drew a response from the prosecutor that was embraced and reiterated by Chapman J: 
‘you might as well try to produce a conflict about the multiplication table’.27 Assumptions 
about the uniqueness and permanence of friction ridge skin are presented as undisputed 
‘biological facts’ and the failure to raise ‘a conflict of evidence on the subject’ is used to 
confirm the reliability of the fingerprint evidence.28  
 Clancy, Krausch and Gunn exemplify an emerging course that was not merely 
replicated but expanded across the ensuing century. Early judicial recourse to ‘the law of 
probabilities’ was quickly replaced by the less qualified language of categorical 
identification already employed by fingerprint examiners and prosecutors.29 
Explanations, or the perceived need for explanations and reference to scientific support, 
similarly dropped away.30 These reports may not be the first uses or decisions, but they 
are the most prominent among the early cases.31 They provide the legal authority, and 
implicitly the epistemological warrant, for relying on fingerprints (alone) as definitive 
proof of identity and guilt. Following conviction, Gunn was executed. 
 
 
3. REPRESENTING LATENT FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE AFTER GUNN 
The extracts reproduced in this section, taken from decisions in the years following Gunn, 
are selected to illustrate the way latent fingerprint evidence was and continues to be 
presented and understood as unequivocal evidence of identity. Spanning the decades from 
the 1920s until the present day, they reveal match decisions being routinely equated, 
without qualification or explanation, with the identification of a specific person.  
 
24 Gunn, iv-vi (italics added). See references to R v Castleton [1909] 3 Cr App R 74; R v Parker [1912] VR 152; and 
People v Jennings, 252 III 534, 96 NE 1077 (1911). 
25 Gunn, vii. Less is made of the multiple prints than might have been. In Gunn, the fact that multiple prints were 
matched to one of a small pool of (usual) suspects reduces the risk of error. Though, the reason for selecting the prints 
to compare may be an issue, especially if the examiner knows about the case, the identity of the suspect, or reasons for 
the selection. See Section 5.C. 
26 Gunn, v-vi (italics added).  
27 Gunn, vi. 
28 Gunn, vi. See also Figure 1, where conviction is characterised as ‘a complete vindication of the value of finger-print 
evidence.’ 
2929 See also Gunn, vi-vii, ix. 
30 Challenges would eventually be satisfied by reference to point standards and ACE-V – see Sections 4.A and 4.B. 
31 Krausch was considered favourably in New South Wales in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681, [143]. 
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 Consider these examples: 
 
… his finger prints had been found on the safe.32 
  
… he ran off leaving behind an identifiable fingerprint.33 
 
A number of indistinct prints were found on the door and an identifiable print which turned out to be 
that of the appellant.34 
 
The imitation gun was wrapped in a black plastic bag, on which Manapouri’s palm print was found 
… Tulafono’s fingerprint was located on …35 
 
Mr M’s fingerprints appear in a number of places on the black polythene bags which surrounded the 
deceased’s body when it was recovered.36 
 
… a fingerprint, established to be that of Mr Gugich, was located in the Essex Street premises …37 
 
Fingerprints from the respondent’s right thumb and left little finger were found on an opened box of 
cartridges at the address.38 
 
Mr Toman was not the occupant of the Wainuiomata premises but his fingerprint was found on a 
sheet of foil in a rubbish tin at that address.39 
 
A police fingerprint expert gave evidence to the effect that a fingerprint identified as having come 
from the respondent, was found on a packet of cigarettes located on the floor inside the premises 
behind the counter.40 
 
A fingerprint lifted from the laptop screen was later identified as Mr Cheng’s.41 
 
32 The Queen v Samuels [1962] NZLR 1036, 1037. See also Mohi v R [2019] NZCA 441, [8]; Vaitohi v R [2019] NZCA 
371, [3]; Woodmass v Police [2019] NZHC 2503, [9]; Nelson v Police [2019] NZHC 2434, [13]; Police v CW [2019] 
NZYC 85, [23]; Sparks v Police [2018] NZCA 530, [6]; Kahia v Police [2017] NZHC 2018, [12]; Parata v Police 
[2018] NZHC 3234, [4]; The Queen v Stokes [2018] NZDC 3880, [29]; R v Alsford [2017] 1 NZLR 710, [10]; Preston 
v R [2017] 2 NZLR 358, [12]; Hardy v The Queen [2017] NZCA 327, [7], see also [8]; Simon v R [2017] NZHC 1235, 
[4]; Reti v The Queen [2016] NZCA 447, [20]; Bouavong v R [2014] 2 NZLR 23, [7]; Gladwin v The Queen [2014] 
NZCA 165, [13], [23]; Wells v The Queen [2014] NZCA 479, [21]; Nieuwenhuiysen v The Queen [2013] NZCA 207, 
[22]; Brown v The Queen [2012] NZCA 457, [12], [40], [41]; Herangi v Police [2012] NZHC 1665, [14]; Britz v The 
Queen (CA161/2012, 1 Jan 2012), [6], [107]; Fulop v The Queen [2011] NZCA 499, [5]; Police v SPT (Youth Court, 
CRI2011270000062, 9 May 2011), [2]-[3]; Police v SJ (NZYC, CRI2010270000183, 22 Feb 2011), [13]; T v New 
Zealand Police (NZHC, CRI 200947027, 30 Sept 2009), [3]-[4]; T v New Zealand Police (NZHC, CRI 200947027, 30 
Sept 2009), [3]-[4]; The Queen v May [2008] NZCA 221, [2]; Nairn v The Queen [2008] NZCA 553, [4], [9]; Barton v 
Police [2008] BCL 848, [10], [47]; R v Reti [2008] NZHC 794 (29 May 2008), [13]; Brown v New Zealand Police 
(High Court, CRI 2006404000368, 26 Feb 2007, Keane J), [4]; The Queen v Wheatley (NZHC, CRI 20060198509, 6 
Sep 2007), [12]; P v Police (NZHC, CRI 2007412000048, 7 Sep 2007), [2]; R v Tuporo (NZCA, BC200662930, 5 Dec 
2006), [7], [20]; The Queen v Shelford and Kingi [2006] NZCA 306, [10], [27]; R v Anderson (NZCA, CA294/04, 9 
Mar 2005), [6]; The Queen v Withey (NZCA, CA469/03, 13 Sep 2004), [6]; R v Holtz [2003] 1 NZLR 667, 671; The 
Queen v Seekamut (NZCA, CA82/03, 10 July 2003), [7], [11], [12]; Rawiri v R (NZCA, CA125/03, BC200361652, 25 
Sep 2003), [4]; Wells v R (NZCA 117/03, 25 Sep 2003), [4]; The Queen v Mokaraka and Te Hira (NZCA, CA286/01 
and CA294/01, 17 Dec 2001), [5]; The Queen v Moore and Moore (NZCA, CA159/00 and CA160/00, 27 July 2000), 
[14]; R v Barton [2000] 2 NZLR 459, [1]; The Queen v Moore (NZCA, CA 399/99, 23 Nov 1999), [2]; R v Dunnill 
[1998] 2 NZLR 341, 343; R v Barlow [1998] 2 NZLR 477, 479; R v Hughes [1998] 1 NZLR 409, 410; R v Harbour 
[1995] 1 NZLR 440, 443; R v Chapman [1992] 2 NZLR 380, 381; R v Pengelly [1992] 1 NZLR 545, 546; R v 
McCallum & Ors (NZCA, CA350/87, 13 Jul 1988), 2; R v Samuels [1985] 1 NZLR 350, 352; R v George [1984] 1 
NZLR 272, 273; R v Reed [1980] 1 NZLR 758, 759; The Queen v Bennett (NZCA, 3 April 1978), 2; R v Rumping 
[1962] IX Law Reports 293, 294. 
33 The Queen v Nuku [1969] NZLR 343. 
34 The Queen v Voice (NZCA, 13 Oct 1978), 2. 
35 R v Manapouri [1995] 2 NZLR 407, 410. 
36 R v M [1996] 3 NZLR 502, 504. 
37 R v Dunnill [1998] 2 NZLR 341, 343. 
38 Question of law in The Queen v Cole (CA 377/99, 18 October 1999), [3]. 
39 The Queen v Toman (NZCA, CA30/04, 24 June 2004), [4], [6]. 
40 R v Lister (NZHC, CRI200548553, 31 May 2005), [1]. 
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A fingerprint expert subsequently examined the fingerprint, and he identified the print as having 
come from Mr C’s right ring finger.42 
 
Mr Morrison, for Ms Ryder, acknowledged at the outset that which was inescapable, namely that her 
fingerprint had been found on two deposit slips and one of the cheques.43 
 
The only evidence against Mr Fenton was the discovery of his fingerprint at the scene of the crime. 
… The lower print was positively identified as Mr Fenton’s left forefinger fingerprint.44 
 
… Mr David was unable to remember using or touching any particular item, but accepted that he 
must have done so given the fact that his fingerprints had been found on them.45 
 
Courts not only re-state the evidence but they frequently endorse the conclusions of 
fingerprint examiners, sometimes as fact.46 In these and other examples, the identification 
does not appear to be open to contestation. Rather, categorical identification demands an 
explanation from the suspect/defendant, and that expectation is often explicit:47 
 
When asked to explain the presence of his fingerprints …48 
 
… the existence of his fingerprints on items … obviously required an explanation.49 
 
Among the many judicial references to latent fingerprints, there are occasions when 
the representation appears more equivocal. Consider the following examples, beginning 
with two extracts from R v Carter:  
 
Fingerprint evidence given at trial … was the only evidence that linked Mr Carter to the Holborn 
Drive address.50  
 
If accepted, that evidence proved that his [Carter’s] fingerprint was on the recipe for 
methamphetamine located in the house.51  
 
… the police found that the fingerprint of his left index finger matched the print from the ranchslider 
door.52 
 
A fingerprint matching the appellant’s was found on electrical tape on the rubbish bag containing 
the firearms.53 
 
These examples might exemplify a more balanced or qualified treatment of latent 
fingerprint evidence that falls short of categorical identification. However, while these 
 
41 Solicitor General of New Zealand v Cheng (NZHC, 19 Sep 2007), [15]. 
42 C v New Zealand Police (CRI2007404265, 3 June 2008, High Court, Auckland, Lang J), [10]. 
43 R v Ngamu [2008] DCR 647, 664. 
44 Fenton v The Queen [2011] NZCA 110, [1]-[6]. 
45 David v The Queen [2013] NZCA 507, [27], [12]. See also R v Wilson [1981] 1 NZLR 316, 319. 
46 These examples are not all straightforward endorsements. Some merely reiterate the Crown’s position or 
describe agreed facts. Some, however, embody a judge’s or court’s assessment of the evidence. None recognises 
or refers to overstatement. 
47 Compare Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462. We might desire an explanation, but none is required in our 
accusatorial system. It is for the Crown to eliminate reasonable doubt and this includes the real possibility, in some 
cases, of error. See also See Gunn, vii, x; The Queen v Leadbitter [1958] NZLR 336, 338; The Queen v May [2008] 
NZCA 221, [19]-[20].   
48 R v Hovell [1987] 1 NZLR 610, 611, 615. 
49 David v The Queen [2013] NZCA 507, [47]-[48]. 
50 R v Carter [2005] 22 NZCA 422, [15]. (italics added) 
51 Carter, [41]. (italics added) 
52 Tuakana v Police (NZHC, CRI 201148864, BC201262185, 23 Feb 2012), [10], [18], [20]. (italics added) 
53 R v Tuhoro [1998] 3 NZLR 568, 570. (italics added) 
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representations are, to varying degrees, more technically defensible, there is no indication 
that they are intended to be, or are actually understood as, more qualified representations 
of latent fingerprint evidence.54 In some cases we encounter more qualified treatment 
alongside categorical identification. Returning to Carter, the trial judge stated: 
 
 … the evidence against him relied upon by the Crown is the presence of his fingerprint on the eight 
page document containing the recipe for methamphetamine …55 
 
In other cases, the same court seamlessly transitions between categorical and more 
qualified representations. 
 
It was forensically examined, and fingerprints were collected and they were matched to you. … It 
was forensically examined and your fingerprints were located in the vehicle.56 
 
It was not until 19 months later, when as a result of checking the accused’s fingerprints following 
his arrest on a minor and unrelated charge it was found that they matched the fingerprints on the 
door frame and window frame ... Fingerprints  … can be shown to be those of the accused.57 
 
None of the more qualified examples is inconsistent with categorical identification. No 
consideration is given to representational ‘inconsistencies’ in any trial or appeal. In a 
society where fingerprints are understood as complete proof of identity, the implications 
of a ‘match’ do not require elucidation.58 
 These conceptual and representational practices are not limited to trials, transcripts and 
judgments. Occasionally a judgment affords a glimpse of pre-trial activities. In R v 
Samuels, for example, a police Sergeant’s testimony about the interview with a suspect 
reveals the same tendency to represent fingerprint evidence as definitive proof of identity: 
 
I said, your prints have been found on some of the cannabis inside the case. He said, what do you 
want me to say. I said, how did they get there. He said I don’t know. I said, I believe they’re palm 
prints. He said, I’m in the shit aren’t I. I said prints don’t lie. He said I don’t know how they got 
there.59 
 
This recollection of events provides a stark illustration of how fingerprint evidence is 
represented and understood by investigators as well as those accused of criminal acts.60 
Fingerprints are unerring. They speak, but do not lie. 
 
 
4. AUTHORITATIVE MODERN CASES 
This section briefly reviews three influential appellate decisions that cast additional light 
on the form of the opinion as well as the underlying ‘methods’ employed by fingerprint 
examiners. The first case considers the now discredited 12 point standard. The second is 
the first reported decision to refer to ACE-V – the ‘method’ that replaced mechanistic 
reliance on a minimum number of similar points.61 That decision – R v Carter – remains 
 
54 Such opinions are not readily susceptible to rational evaluation – see Section 5.B. 
55 Carter, [83]. (italics added) 
56 Police v Wikaira [2018] NZDC 5291, [6]-[7], [21], [23]-[25] (italics added). In Wikaira, [12], a categorical claim is 
also made in relation to DNA. See also R v Julian [1981] 1 NZLR 743, 745. 
57 R v Hovell [1986] 1 NZLR 500, 502, 506. (italics added) 
58 See Wallace v The Queen [2010] NZCA 46, [69], discussed in Section 4.C. 
59 R v Samuels [1985] 1 NZLR 350, 353. (uncorrected, italics added) 
60 See also R v Edwards [2005] 2 NZLR 709. 
61 The terms ‘method’ and ‘procedure’ are used interchangeably throughout this article. 
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authoritative.62 The final case provides insight into the way the Court of Appeal handles 
simultaneous challenges to DNA and fingerprint evidence. Interestingly, these cases 
confirm that courts do not require fingerprint examiners to testify in categorical terms. 
Rather, this is how examiners have elected to characterise their opinions and how their 
opinions have been adduced by prosecutors. Courts have admitted this evidence and left 
overstatement and accuracy for the defence and the jury. 
 
A. Points standards and (un)certainty  
In R v Buisson there was a challenge to latent fingerprint evidence said to link the 
defendant with a kilogram of hashish.63 If this evidence was accepted, the case against the 
accused ‘was virtually unanswerable’.64 The main grounds of appeal were focused on the 
number of points of similarity between the two prints and their significance for 
admissibility and proof.  
 Two fingerprint examiners called by the Crown identified the latent print on the 
hashish to Buisson. Defence challenges to opinions about identity are unusual, and in this 
truly exceptional case the defence called two fingerprint examiners. It was the contention 
of the defendant/appellant that an examiner was required to locate at least 12 points of 
similarity between the latent print and a reference print – here the prints of Buisson – 
before they could declare a match and an identification. The two senior fingerprint 
examiners called by the state both claimed to observe the requisite minimum of 12 points 
whereas the retired examiners engaged by the defendant could only locate 7 and 8 points, 
respectively. There were inconsistencies between the examiners as to whether an 
identification could be declared and reported with less than 12 points of similarity. 
 A decade before the English decision in R v Buckley, the Court of Appeal explains that 
there is no legal requirement for a specific minimum number of points before latent 
fingerprint evidence is admissible on the question of identity.65 That is, fingerprint 
examiners are not required to locate 12 points before testifying and they are not required 
to opine in categorical terms.66 The Court seems to recognise that the point standard was 
something the community of fingerprint examiners introduced in their anxiety ‘to ensure 
that fingerprint evidence will always be accepted as certain proof of identity’.67 
 The trial judge summarised the conflicting ‘observations and conclusions of the two 
sets of expert witnesses’.68  
 
You will consider the experience and qualifications and qualifications of each of the experts: how 
they gave their evidence. You will weigh what you have heard about the need for continually honing 
skills to fulfill this task and all aspects of the evidence they gave, so that you can reach a conclusion 
as to what you find on the fingerprint evidence.69 
 
On the basis of the examiners’ evidence and the trial judge’s directions the jury was left 
with ‘the task of evaluating their evidence and deciding which opinion they could 
 
62 R v Carter [2005] 22 NZCA 422. 
63 R v Buisson [1990] 2 NZLR 542 
64 Buisson, 545. 
65 R v Buckley (1999) 163 JP 561. 
66 Buisson, 548. The Court observes that ‘police agencies may be depriving the prosecution of useful information based 
on a lesser degree of statistical probability.’ 
67 Buisson, 547. The influential International Association for Identification (IAI) passed a resolution in 1979 that made 
it professional misconduct for examiners to provide courtroom testimony about identification as ‘possible, probable, or 
likely’ rather than ‘certain’. International Association for Identification, ‘Resolution VII, (August 1979) Identification 
News 29. The IAI has slowly responded to the research and reports discussed in Section 5. 
68 Buisson, 547. 
69 Buisson, 548. 
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accept’.70 For the Court of Appeal, the ‘assessment of the reliability and cogency of their 
opinions was very much a jury matter’.71 The Court was satisfied that the directions were 
‘appropriate … in the circumstance of this case’.72 Though, the ‘desirability’ of warning 
the jury that ‘the 12 point standard has normally been followed in New Zealand’ was 
affirmed.73 
 Buisson is revealing because the case is contested around whether there are twelve 
points of similarity, not about whether that affects accuracy. There are no references to 
scientific materials. Points and their significance are explicitly left as issues for the jury to 
resolve. 
 
B. ACE-V, the elision of points, and the persistence of overstatement 
R v Carter represents modern legal authority on latent fingerprint evidence in New 
Zealand.74 As part of a circumstantial case, the Crown adduced latent fingerprint 
evidence to link a recipe for methamphetamine to Carter. The fingerprint examiner 
identified Carter based on a single latent fingerprint but did not provide any reasons for 
the match decision. The appeal focused on the admissibility of the fingerprint evidence 
given the absence of reasons, as well as the adequacy of the judicial directions. 
 When questioned about his identification, the fingerprint examiner opaquely 
referenced the new ACE-V ‘method’ (more below), insisting that ‘the correct application 
of the science will lead to the correct result.’75 Relying on ACE-V and his training and 
experience, the examiner rejected the possibility of error:  
 
I put the question again, do you accept you could be wrong? .... No. 
Never wrong? ... No, in other things but not in the identification process itself.76 
… 
Why should the jurors simply accept your opinion? ... I have been trained, I have 5 years of training 
and experience and 8 years of built up experience, training courses and so on and I have been 
proficiency tested.77 
 
When questioned he also candidly acknowledged the subjective dimension of the holistic 
comparison process associated with ACE-V that ‘happens in the mind, in the head.’78  
 The examiner did not make contemporaneous notes or provide reasons for the match 
and identification. Interestingly, these omissions were inconsistent with ‘uncontroversial’ 
principles said, by the Court of Appeal, to guide the production of all expert evidence, 
specifically: 
 
(b) the facts, matters and assumptions on which opinions are expressed must be stated 
explicitly; 
(c) the reasons for opinions given must be stated explicitly; 
 
70 Buisson, 547. 
71 Buisson, 548. 
72 Buisson, 548. 
73 Buisson, 548. 
74 R v Carter [2005] 22 NZCA 422. See e.g. Wallace v The Queen [2010] NZCA 46, [68] and Wells, [42]. Carter 
was decided before the Evidence Act 2006 was introduced and interpreted to require ‘reliability’. 
75 Carter, [58]. ACE-V was not really new. The process was originally proposed by Roy Huber as a basic method for 
all feature comparison disciplines. The acronym ACE-V was popularised by David Ashbaugh, of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and seems to have been taken up with the demise of point standards. See Roy Huber, ‘Expert Witness’ 
(1959) 2(3) Criminal Law Quarterly 276; David Ashbaugh, Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An 
Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology (CRC Press, 1999). 
76 Carter, [58]. 
77 Carter, [58], see also [54]. On the limits of training and experience, see Section 5. On proficiency testing, see below 
n 169. 
78 Carter, [58] (italics in original), [56]. 
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(d) any literature or other material used or relied upon to support opinions must be referred to 
by the expert; 
… 
(f) if an expert witness believes that his or her evidence might be incomplete or inaccurate 
without some qualification, that qualification must be stated; 
(g) an expert has an overriding duty to assist the Court impartially on relevant matters within 
the expert’s area of expertise; and 
(h) an expert is not an advocate for any party.79 
 
With leave, on appeal, the Crown provided additional materials said to support ACE-V as 
well as traditional assumptions underpinning latent fingerprint comparison.80 
 Informally, Carter announces a shift in the ‘method’ employed by New Zealand’s 
fingerprint examiners. That is, a shift from reliance on a minimum number of points of 
similarity to a more holistic approach to comparison. The Court of Appeal summarises 
the new procedure associated with the acronym ACE-V: 
 
Analysis is the assessment of a friction ridge impression to determine suitability for comparison. 
Comparison is the direct or side by side observation of friction ridge detail to determine whether the 
detail of two impressions is in agreement based upon similarity, sequence and spacial relationship. 
Evaluation is the formulation of a conclusion based upon analysis and comparison of friction ridge 
impressions: evaluation may result in individualisation of friction ridge impressions, giving rise to 
identification or exclusion or an inconclusive result. Verification is a peer review process which 
must occur following a positive identification and which may occur if a finding results in exclusion 
or an inconclusive result.81 
 
For the Court of Appeal, the examiner’s opinion was effectively ‘repaired’ by the 
supplementary materials.  
 As in Buisson, the impugned directions on the fingerprint evidence were generic and 
provide little in the way of practical assistance.82 
 
In assessing that evidence, you must have regard to the qualifications and experience of the 
witnesses, but you have to remember that this is a trial by jury; it is not a trial by expert, and it is for 
you to decide how much weight or importance you give to the opinions which the expert witnesses 
have expressed. Indeed, whether you accept them at all in the context of all the evidence that you 
have heard. You also need to remember that the expert witnesses gave their evidence in relation to 
their areas of expertise.83 
 
The trial judge referred to the need to consider ‘the fingerprint evidence in conjunction 
with all the other evidence’, and reiterated the Crown’s submission that the ‘fingerprint 
evidence … was “damning”.’84  
In the end, notwithstanding the absence of reasons and non-compliance with 
uncontroversial principles applying ‘in all cases where expert evidence is called’, the 
Court of Appeal was satisfied that unqualified fingerprint evidence identifying Carter was 
 
79 Carter, [47]. This is revealing in so far as the non-compliance concerns a type of evidence that is in routine use in 
investigations and prosecutions. Non-compliance reveals something about the taken-for-granted status of fingerprint 
comparison and the small number of challenges to the method and resulting identifications. See Edmond, ‘Fingerprint 
evidence in New Zealand’s courts: A history of legal challenges’. 
80 These included: Campbell, ‘Fingerprints: A Review’ (1985) Crim LR 195; Leadbetter, ‘Fingerprint Evidence in 
England and Wales – The Revised Standard’ [2005] 45 Med Sci Law 1; Vanderkolk, ‘Forensic Individualization 
of Images Using Quality and Quantity of Information’ (1999) 49 Journal of Forensic Identification 246 and a set 
of guidelines prepared by fingerprint examiners based in the US. None of these are scientific materials. 
81 Carter, [72]. 
82 Carter, [82]. 
83 Carter, [80] (italics added).  
84 Carter, [82]. 
 12 
properly admitted and the directions adequate.85 Following remarkably limited 
engagement with the two ‘methods’ and the reasons for the change, Carter implicitly 
endorses the shift to ACE-V and the continuing reception of categorical identification. 
 
C. Probabilistic DNA evidence versus categorical identification by fingerprint 
Disparities surface clearly in Wallace v R.86 There, unwittingly, the Court of Appeal deals 
with challenges to two different types of feature comparison evidence inconsistently.87 
The first is a challenge to DNA evidence; that focuses on some relatively novel 
procedures. Here the Court exhibits concern with validity and reliability, and particularly 
the way the DNA evidence is expressed. The nuclear DNA profile on a cigarette ‘was 10 
million million times more likely to have come from Mr Wallace than from another 
person selected at random from the general populace.’88 Following the Y-STR analysis 
‘the appellant could not be excluded as a contributor.’89 Comparing this partial profile to 
a database of New Zealand males, it ‘was 13 times more likely to have originated from 
Mr Wallace or a paternal relative than from another male randomly selected.’90 The 
prosecutor presented the DNA evidence as ‘consistent with the Crown case but not 
determinative of it’91 and ‘noted in closing that this evidence was not a unique 
identifier.’92 In summing up the trial judge explained to the jury that the Y-STR and LCN 
DNA evidence ‘could’ have been from the defendant and victim, respectively.93 There 
are references to DNA protocols, transfer and contamination and stochastic thresholds. In 
addition, the judgment provides a brief history of DNA profiling and a discussion of 
Bayesian inference – the dominant statistical framework for presenting DNA evidence. 
Perhaps it is ironic, given the treatment of fingerprints (below), that in its discussion of 
the DNA evidence the Court of Appeal refers to the ‘(dangerous) power of the 
unqualified finding of an authoritative expert that … links an accused to the crime 
scene’.94 
 The fingerprint evidence, in stark contrast, was presented by the state in conventional 
categorical terms. That version was reiterated by the trial judge who told the jury that the 
‘accused’s fingerprint was found in the [victim’s] address book’.95 Similarly, the Court of 
Appeal endorses the examiner’s opinion as fact: a ‘diary was located, with Mr Wallace’s 
fingerprint on a page.’96 Trial counsel focused her cross-examination on the 
‘impossibility of aging prints’.97 The trial judge ‘gave no specific direction on fingerprint 
evidence.’98  
 Appellate counsel raised a number of issues pertaining to identification by fingerprint, 
such as known mistakes, the danger of confirmation bias, and the match decision being 
merely opinion.99 He also sought to introduce the report of a fingerprint examiner from 
the United States, who could locate only 11 shared points, as fresh evidence. This later 
 
85 Carter, [47]. 
86 Wallace v The Queen [2010] NZCA 46. 
87 See also Wells v The Queen [2014] NZCA 479, [58]. 
88 Wallace, [18]. 
89 Wallace, [31]. 
90 Wallace, [33]. 
91 Wallace, [40]. 
92 Wallace, [38]. (italics added) 
93 Wallace, [41]. 
94 Wallace, [44]. 
95 Wallace, [63]. 
96 Wallace, [20].  
97 Trial counsel seems to have focused on timing because of the conceptual difficulty in dealing with the possibility of 
error. 
98 Wallace, [72]. 
99 These issues suggest some limited awareness of the developments discussed in Section 5.B. 
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evidence was inattentive to Buisson (and Carter) and the Court of Appeal notes that the 
defence witness did not suggest ‘that there is no correlation at all’ between the prints.100 
In passing, there is acknowledgment that challenges to fingerprint evidence are unusual, 
perhaps ‘because of an ongoing perception that in general fingerprint evidence is 
irrefutable and safe.’101 
 It is revealing that the lawyers and judges do not appear to appreciate that DNA 
comparison and fingerprint comparison are both feature comparison procedures with 
foundational correspondences.102 In principle, both should be expressed in empirically-
based statistical forms that include some indication of limitations and error. Whereas the 
Court goes to some length to address the reliability and limitations of the DNA evidence, 
categorical identification by latent fingerprint passes without serious challenge or judicial 
qualification.103 
 Together, these examples reinforce the commitment amongst fingerprint examiners to 
categorical identification even though New Zealand’s courts were open to less stringent 
forms of opinion about the significance of fingerprint evidence. These three cases are 
among the tiny proportion of judicial decisions that refer to fingerprint ‘methods’. 
Though, none is concerned with evidence for the validity or accuracy of either points of 
similarity or ACE-V. There is no engagement with scientific research and no explanation 
for the move from point standards to ACE-V.104 On reflection, this might be considered 
curious. The fact that a scientific review, conducted for the Forensic Science Service 
(UK) during the mid 1990s, had dismissed prevailing point standards as arbitrary does 
not seem to have been disclosed.105 The fact that ACE-V seems to have been introduced, 
at least in part, to fill a methodological void is not disclosed or recognised by the lawyers 
and judges. Rather, ACE-V is presented and accepted as scientific advancement.  
 We now turn to consider what independent scientific reviews were to make of ACE-V, 
categorical identification, claims about practical infallibility and subjective interpretation. 
 
 
5. THE SCIENCE: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT FINGERPRINT COMPARISON 
Scientific reviews provide an independent perspective on fingerprint comparison and the 
claims of examiners. These important scientific perspectives are absent from both the 
historical and contemporary treatment of fingerprint evidence in New Zealand’s courts.106 
To put the scientific assessment in context it is useful to introduce the procedures 
employed by latent fingerprint examiners. 
 
A. A very brief introduction to identification by latent fingerprint 
 
100 Wallace, [75]. 
101 Wallace, [69]. Such observations make persistence with generic directions curious. 
102 See e.g. National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
(National Academies Press, 2009) 7 (‘NRC report’) and President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology, Executive Office of the President, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity 
of Feature-Comparison Methods (Report to the President, September 2016) (‘PCAST Report’) 46ff. According to 
these scientific organisations, validation is required for all feature-comparison procedures. See Gary Edmond, 
‘What lawyers should know about the forensic “sciences”?’ (2014) 36 Adelaide 
Law Review 33. 
103 It might not be insignificant that Fingerprint Sections are housed within New Zealand police whereas DNA 
profiling and many other science-based forensic procedures are housed within ESR. 
104 There are references to various guidelines and articles, but these are not consistent with the scientific research 
and advice discussed in Section 5. 
105 There are no references to Ian Evett and Robin Williams, ‘Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in 
England and Wales’ (1996) 46(4) Journal of Forensic Identification 49. 
106 There was a limited and unsuccessful attempt to bring a few issues to the attention of the Court of Appeal in 
Wallace, [66]-[67] – see Section 4.C. 
 14 
At its basics, fingerprint comparison involves determining whether a latent fingerprint or 
other friction ridge print (e.g. palm or foot) from an unknown person is sufficient – in 
terms of quality and quantity – for comparison with another (usually a known or 
reference) fingerprint.107 When deemed sufficient, fingerprint examiners look at 
characteristics in the print (e.g. ridge endings, deltas and whorls), various levels of detail, 
as well as scars, in order to determine whether two fingerprints match, do not match or 
are inconclusive. A match decision is a declaration that there are no meaningful 
differences between two (sufficient) prints and the two prints were made by the same 
person. The underlying logic operates as follows: because fingerprints are unique, if two 
fingerprints are sufficiently similar (and matched) then they must have been made by the 
same person. There are, as we shall see, problems with this logic, even if we were to 
accept underlying assumptions about uniqueness and permanence.108  
 Like proverbial snowflakes, the marks left by friction ridge skin (e.g. fingerprints or 
fingermarks) are never identical.109 They are always different because of variations in 
surfaces, oils and residues on hands, the pressure of deposition, their extent, damage to 
fingers, as well as smudging, sliding, multiple touches, interference and deterioration, the 
way fingerprints are collected, processed and documented, and so on. ‘Sufficiency’ and 
‘match’ (as well as ‘non-match’ and ‘inconclusive’) decisions are inescapably subjective 
determinations.110 There is, in addition, a ‘leap of faith’ in moving from characterising 
prints as sufficiently similar to declare a ‘match’ to equating that match with the 
identification of a specific person.111 Focus is often directed to uniqueness and prints 
being identical rather than the frequency of features (contrast DNA profiling), the 
conventions, standards and interpretative practices used by examiners, and the risk of 
error.112 
 The way fingerprint examiners undertook their assessment of the sufficiency of prints 
for comparison, their comparisons, evaluation and processes of review were not always 
rigorous, meaningfully standardised or temporally ordered. Most of the practices and 
procedures, including the equation of a match with categorical identification emerged out 
of examiner beliefs and custom, confusion amongst examiners (and senior police) as to 
what courts in New Zealand (and elsewhere) required, as well as what courts allowed, 
rather than scientific research and advice. Historically, there was a tendency to count 
characteristics (or points) of similarity between prints and to declare a match when some 
minimum threshold was reached as in Buisson. There was international variation around 
the precise number of points required. Longstanding convention in England and Wales 
 
107 Brad Ulery et al, ‘Measuring What Latent Fingerprint Examiners Consider Sufficient Information for 
Individualisation Determinations’ (2015) 10(2) PLOS One e0118172. Sometimes unknown prints are compared, for 
example, in order to link separate crimes to an individual, as in The Queen v Nuku [1969] NZLR 343. 
108 For, fingerprint examiners occasionally make errors, and so claims about uniqueness do not overcome a range of 
interpretive problems and mistakes. These are discussed in Section 5.B. See also Michael Saks and Jonathan Koehler, 
‘The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science’ (2008) 61 Vanderbilt Law Review 199; Simon Cole, ‘Forensics 
without Uniqueness, Conclusions without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification’ (2009) 
8 Law, Probability, & Risk 233; Jonathan Koehler and Michael Saks, ‘Individualization claims in forensic science: Still 
unwarranted’ (2010) 75 Brooklyn Law Review 1187. 
109 Contrast the description of the fingerprints as ‘identical’ in Clancy. See National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach 
(Report, February 2012) 204 (‘NIST Report’).  
110 That is, when humans are involved. See NRC Report, 8; NIST Report, 39; PCAST report, 5; William Thompson et 
al, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis 
— Latent Fingerprint Examination (Report No 2, 15 September 2017) 46ff (‘AAAS Report’). 
111 AAAS Report, 71: ‘While latent print examiners may well be able to exclude the preponderance of the human 
population as possible sources of a latent print, there is no scientific basis for estimating the number of people who 
could not be excluded and, consequently, no scientific basis for determining when the pool of possible sources is 
limited to a single person.’ 
112 AAAS Report, 5, 21. 
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required 16 points. For most of the twentieth century New Zealand Police seem to have 
required twelve.113 There was widespread, though misguided, belief that 12 points was 
sufficiently conservative to eradicate any chance of error – as the Court of Appeal seems 
to have appreciated in Buisson.114 
 Even with the introduction of the more holistic ACE-V ‘method’ latent fingerprint 
examiners continue to operate in the shadow of these traditions.115 They also persist with 
the unprincipled commitment to testifying only in the terms match (categorical 
identification), non-match and inconclusive (usually expressed in the pro-prosecution 
form ‘cannot exclude’). Unlike the probabilistic results associated with DNA profiling 
(e.g. in Wallace), there is no insight into the probative value of ‘inconclusive’ and 
‘match’ decisions.116 Fingerprint examiners exaggerate the significance of a match and 
tend to under-value inconclusive decisions. 
 Beginning in the 1970s police agencies around the world began to introduce computer 
programs (e.g. AFIS) to store and search their ever-expanding fingerprint collections. 
Even today, as algorithms are becoming increasingly powerful, in most jurisdictions it is 
an examiner who makes the decision about which of the prints returned by the algorithm 
search to compare and whether specific prints match. At its core latent fingerprint 
comparison remains a subjective human process. And, as the number of fingerprints 
available through electronic databases expands into the tens and hundreds of millions, the 
chance of adventitious matching – i.e. mis-matching very similar looking prints from 
different persons (especially latent prints at the limits of sufficiency) – increases. 
 
B. Independent scientific reviews 
In recent decades external scientific (and scholarly) interest in latent fingerprint 
comparison, and the forensic sciences more generally, has increased exponentially.117 
There are a number of reasons for this attention, beginning with ‘spill-over’ from early 
critiques of handwriting comparison in the late 1980s, more targeted studies of the 
history of latent fingerprint comparison in the United States (especially the work of 
Simon Cole), and, perhaps more significantly, admissibility challenges in the United 
 
113 See e.g. R v Samuels [1985] 1 NZLR 350 and the discussion in Section 4.A. 
114 See Evett and Williams, ‘Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales’. 
115 See e.g. Wells v The Queen [2014] NZCA 479, [60]. 
116 PCAST Report, 6; AAAS Report, 11, 21, 23, 63-68. 
117 See e.g. David L Faigman, Elise Porter and Michael Saks, ‘Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: 
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence’ (1994) 15 
Cardozo Law Review 1799; Michael Saks, ‘Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with 
Forensic Identification Science’ (1998) 49 Hastings Law Journal 1069; Michael Risinger & Michael Saks, ‘A House 
with No Foundation’ (2003) 20 Issues in Science & Technology 35; J Moriarty & Michael Saks, ‘Forensic Science: 
Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping (2005) 44 Judges’ Journal 16; Michael Saks, ‘Banishing the Ipse 
Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science’ (2000) 57 Wash & Lee Law Review 879; Margaret 
Berger, ‘What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?’ (2005) 95 American Journal of Public Health S59; Margaret 
Berger, ‘Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions Daubert Does Not Answer’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall L Rev 
1125; David Faigman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law (New York: WH Freeman, 1999); 
William Thompson, ‘Analyzing the Relevance and Admissibility of Bullet Lead Evidence: Did the NRC Report Miss 
the Target?’ (2005) 46 Jurimetrics Journal 65; Erica Beecher Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An 
Interdisciplinary Framework for Intellectual Due Process (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also 
Kelly Pyrek, Forensic Science under Siege: The Challenges of Forensic Laboratories and the MedicoLegal Death 
Investigation System (London: Academic Press, 2007); Gary Edmond and Kent Roach, ‘A contextual approach to the 
admissibility of the state’s forensic science and medical evidence (2012) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 343. 
Issues are discussed in standard US reference works, such as David Faigman et al, Modern Scientific Evidence: The 
Law and Science of Expert Testimony (Eagan, MN: Thomson/West 2016); Paul Giannelli and Edward Imwinkelried, 
eds, Scientific Evidence (Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2012). 
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States combined with several high profile mis-identifications (notably Brandon Mayfield 
in the United States and Shirley McKie in Scotland).118  
 A range of pre-eminent scientific and technical organisations – including the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NRC report), the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST report), the President’s Council of 
Advisers on Science and Technology (PCAST report), the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS report) – undertook reviews of the forensic sciences.119 
All of the resulting reports considered latent fingerprint comparison, with the NIST and 
AAAS reports being exclusive in their focus. The independent committees responsible 
for these reports – composed of multidisciplinary collectives of scientists, biomedical 
researchers, engineers and statisticians – were surprised and remarkably critical of what 
they encountered. Five issues drawn from the scientific reviews will enhance our 
understanding of latent fingerprint comparison.120 Let’s begin with the modern 
incarnation of the ‘method’.  
 ACE-V is understood and represented by examiners – as in Carter – as (practically) 
infallible.121 It is used to support the equation of match decisions with categorical 
identification of a specific person.122 Yet, when independent scientists came to examine 
the research supporting latent fingerprint comparison they could find no validation 
studies.123 That is, there were no studies that had formally evaluated latent fingerprint 
examiners and their procedures (including ACE-V), to determine validity and, 
specifically, their reliability or accuracy.124 A seminal review by the National Research 
Council (NRC report) of the National Academy of Sciences (US) made a critical 
assessment that extended well beyond fingerprint comparison. Exempting nuclear DNA 
analysis, the NRC concluded that: ‘no forensic method has been rigorously shown to 
have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a 
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.’125 This statement sits 
very awkwardly against claims by latent fingerprint examiners that they could identify 
specific individuals with certitude, and judicial assertions that fingerprint comparison was 
 
118 See e.g. Michael Risinger, M Denbeaux and Michael Saks, ‘Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational 
Knowledge: The Lesson of Handwriting “Expertise”’ (1989) 137 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 731; Office 
of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (US Department of Justice, 
March 2006); A. Campbell, The Fingerprint Inquiry Report (Edinburgh: APS Group Scotland, 2011) (‘The Fingerprint 
Inquiry’); US v Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (cited in Carter, [63]); United States v Llera Plaza 179 F. Supp. 
2d 492 (E.D. Pa 2002); United States v Llera Plaza 188 F. Supp 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See also Cole, Suspect 
Identities. 
119 National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National 
Academies Press, 2009) (‘NRC Report’); Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through 
a Systems Approach (Report, February 2012) (‘NIST Report’); PCAST Report; William Thompson et al, American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis — Latent 
Fingerprint Examination (Report No 2, 15 September 2017) (‘AAAS Report’). 
120 Readers will benefit from direct engagement with the various reports and ongoing research, as well as publications 
by NIST (in the United States) and the Forensic Science Regulator (in the United Kingdom). See e.g. Forensic Science 
Regulator, Codes of Practice and Conduct: Fingerprint Comparison FSR-C-128 (Home Office, 2017), 13, [12.1.2]-
[12.1.3]. 
121 Errors are sometimes said to be caused by examiners, rather than the method. Though, see Simon Cole, ‘More than 
Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification’ (2005) 95 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 
985. 
122 Often in conjunction with assumptions about permanence and uniqueness, and the long training and experience 
possessed by examiners. 
123 NRC Report, 142–5, citing Lyn Haber and Ralph N Haber, ‘Scientific validation of fingerprint evidence under 
Daubert’ (2008) 7 Law, Probability & Risk 87–109. 
124 For a definition of ‘validity’, see PCAST Report, 44-66. In layman’s terms, validity addresses the issue of whether a 
procedure does what it is said (or intended) to do, the conditions in which it is known to do so, and how well. 
125 NRC Report, 7, 100. 
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effectively beyond challenge given its basis in ‘known scientific facts’ – see Sections 2, 3 
and 4. 
 In its review of latent fingerprint comparison, the NRC report and subsequent reviews, 
offered a disruptive assessment of ACE-V. Rather than an infallible method, the NRC 
explained that: 
 
ACE-V provides a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge analyses. However, 
this framework is not specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of analysis. 
ACE-V does not guard against bias; is too broad to ensure repeatability and transparency; and 
does not guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the same results. For these reasons, 
merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific 
manner or producing reliable results.126  
 
ACE-V was recognised for what it is; an inescapably subjective process that lacks 
meaningful standards. Some examiners commence with comparison and many 
bureaus continue to rely on non-blind verification.127  
 This leads to the second point. Latent fingerprint examiners have claimed that a 
match decision represents the identification of a specific person and that fingerprints 
‘do not lie’. When independent scientists eventually reviewed these claims they were 
rejected out of hand. The NRC concludes that ‘there is limited information about the 
accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses’ but ‘claims that these analyses 
have zero error rates are not scientifically plausible.’128 According to the NRC, 
claims about ‘“positive” identification should be replaced by more modest claims 
about the meaning and significance of a “match.”’129 A report prepared by the 
President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (PCAST report) draws 
attention to ‘the long history of exaggerated claims for the accuracy of forensic 
methods includes the DOJ’s [Department of Justice (US)] own prior statement that 
latent fingerprint analysis was “infallible”.’130 The American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) described ‘traditional’ claims ‘to be able to 
“identify” the source of a latent print with 100% accuracy … as indefensible.’131 
 A report prepared under the auspices of the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) recommended against equating match decisions with categorical 
identification (or individualisation).  
 
Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a source attribution to the 
exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent print examiners should not report or 
testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the 
world.132 
 
Simultaneously, The Fingerprint Inquiry in Scotland, reviewing the McKie case, 
recommended that ‘[e]xaminers should discontinue reporting conclusions on 
 
126 NRC Report 142-143; NIST Report, 9, 123. See also Saks and Koehler, ‘The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic 
Science’; Cole, ‘Forensics without Uniqueness’; Koehler and Saks, ‘Individualization claims in forensic science’. 
127 In the aftermath of the NRC and NIST reports, the FBI has adopted Linear ACE-V where careful attention is 
directed toward the steps being completed in sequence, particularly analysis of observable features of the latent print 
before comparison with another (usually known) print. 
128 NRC Report, 142 (italics added) and 143: ‘clearly unrealistic’. 
129 NRC Report, 142, quoting Jennifer Mnookin, ‘The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a 
Fingerprinting Moderate’ (2008) 7 Law, Probability & Risk 127 
130 PCAST Report 54, n124. 
131 AAAS Report, 71 (italics added), see also 9, 60. 
132 NIST Report, 197: Recommendation 3.7, see also 106. 
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identification or exclusion with a claim to 100% certainty or on any other basis 
suggesting that fingerprint evidence is infallible.’133  
 Concerned about widespread over-claiming, and eager to determine validity and 
reliability in the wake of the NRC report, research scientists began to study the 
performance of latent fingerprint examiners. The first studies confirmed that trained 
examiners are very good, and much better than novices (i.e. laypersons such as judges 
and jurors), at comparing prints. Significantly, however, independent study found small 
numbers of false positive errors (i.e. mistaken identifications) and false negative errors 
(i.e. misses). Based on a couple of black box studies (see Table 1), PCAST concludes that 
latent fingerprint comparison is foundationally valid.134 This came, no doubt, as welcome 
relief.135 Simultaneously, however, the President’s Council expresses concerns about the 
way comparisons are routinely undertaken in practice – i.e. as applied.136 This embodied 
unresolved issues relating to standards, the lack of rigorous proficiency testing as well as 




Table 1: Error rates in studies of latent print analysis.137 
 
 On the basis of the available research PCAST concludes that the ‘false positive rate … 
is substantial and is likely to be higher than expected by many jurors based on 
longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis.’138 PCAST and the 
AAAS emphasised the need to provide decision-makers with more information: 
 
Members of the public are likely to hold misconceptions about latent print examination that 
have been shaped by decades of overstatement by latent print examiners. To combat these 
misperceptions, latent print examiners should include specific caveats in reports that 
 
133 The Fingerprint Inquiry, 741: Recommendation 3. 
134 PCAST Report, 52-53, 101-102. According to the PCAST Report, 4, 56, ‘Foundational validity . . . means that 
a method can, in principle, be reliable’ and ‘[v]alidity as applied means that the method has been reliably applied 
in practice.’ Foundational validity confirms that a procedure works when tested in controlled conditions, whereas 
the question of whether it works in its various real world applications raises validity as applied. 
135 On ‘black box’ studies, see PCAST Report, 5-6: ‘For subjective feature-comparison methods [such as latent 
fingerprint comparison], because the individual steps are not objectively specified, the method [i.e. ACE] must be 
evaluated as if it were a “black box” in the examiner’s head. Evaluations of validity and reliability must therefore 
be based on “black-box studies,” in which many examiners render decisions about many independent tests 
(typically, involving “questioned” samples and one or more “known” samples) and the error rates are determined.’ 
136 PCAST Report, 66, 102: ‘there are a number of important issues related to its validity as applied.’ 
137 PCAST Report, 98. The ‘bound on rate’ is a statistical estimate, that refers to the ‘odds of a false positive occurring, 
based on the upper 95 percent confidence bound—that is, the rate could reasonably be as high as this value.’ 
138 PCAST Report, 910. 
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acknowledge the limitations of the discipline. They should acknowledge: (1) that the 
conclusions being reported are opinions rather than facts (as in all pattern-matching 
disciplines), (2) that it is not possible for a latent print examiner to determine that two friction 
ridge impressions originated from the same source to the exclusion of all others; and (3) that 
errors have occurred in studies of the accuracy of latent print examination.139 
 
Both PCAST and the AAAS insist that disclosure and explanation are important because 
misconceptions are pervasive.140 
 The third point concerns the real risks created by the historical failure to attend to 
human factors, especially cognitive bias, associated with interpretive processes. These 
concerns entered prominence just over a decade ago when a cognitive scientist induced 
experienced latent fingerprint examiners to reverse their opinion about whether two 
fingerprints matched by exposing them to extraneous information about the fingerprints 
they were comparing.141 This admittedly small experiment had a profound impact, in part 
because of the claims examiners had made about their method and abilities. 
Subsequently, all of the scientific reviews have drawn attention to the desirability of 
shielding examiners from domain-irrelevant information.142 Historically, fingerprint 
examiners were exposed, or had access, to information extraneous to the task of 
comparison – such as criminal records and investigators’ beliefs about the identity of the 
perpetrator. Additionally, it was common for examiners to undertake Analysis, 
Comparison and Evaluation simultaneously – with the prints side by side – 
notwithstanding the risks this introduced.143 Verification was rarely, if ever, blind.144 The 
person(s) reviewing the decision knew they were reviewing a match, frequently in 
conjunction with the identity of the original examiner.145 We now know that each of these 
practices increases the risk of error. 
 The fourth point concerns assumptions about permanence and uniqueness.146 
Notwithstanding routine presentation as biological fact, we do not know whether friction 
ridge skin is unique.147 But that is less important than it might at first appear.148 We do 
know that friction ridge skin is highly variable – and this is all that is required for it to 
have value in assisting with issues of identity.149 Uniqueness does not solve the problem 
of identity or eliminate error because individual examiners have to make decisions about 
whether a particular latent is sufficient for analysis and, if it is deemed so, to make a 
 
139 AAAS Report, 9, 73. 
140 NAS Report, 53: ‘The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic science 
professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the 
courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem’. See also Law Commission of England and Wales, 
Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (2011).  
141 I. Dror, D. Charlton and A. Peron, ‘Contextual information renders experts vulnerable to making erroneous 
identifications’ (2006) 156 Forensic Science International 74; I. Dror and R Rosenthal, ‘Meta-analytically 
quantifying the reliability and biasability of forensic experts’ (2008) 53 Journal of Forensic Science 900. 
142 NRC Report; The Fingerprint Inquiry; NIST Report; PCAST Report and the AAAS Report. 
143 See e.g. AAAS Report, 8: Recommendation 8. 
144 If verification ever ‘caught’ errors or disagreements they were not disclosed. On the value of verification, see Kaye 
Ballantyne et al, ‘Peer review in forensic science’ (2017) 277 Forensic Science International 66. 
145 Part of the human condition, cognitive vulnerabilities are the reason sophisticated biomedical researchers employ 
double blind clinical trials and many other scientists use forms of blinding. See the discussion in Barker Bausell, Snake 
oil science: The truth about complimentary and alternative medicine (Oxford, 2007) and Harry Collins, Gravity’s 
Ghost: Scientific Discovery in the Twenty First Century (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
146 NRC Report, 188–9. 
147 Or, more colloquially, fingerprints. 
148 PCAST Report, 62: ‘uniqueness studies miss the fundamental point. The issue is not whether objects or features 
differ; they surely do if one looks at a fine enough level. The issue is how well and under what circumstances 
examiners applying a given metrological method can reliably detect relevant differences in features to reliably identify 
whether they share a common source.’ 
149 DNA is not unique, but DNA profiling is nevertheless a very powerful means of helping to discriminate between 
and to identify persons. 
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decision about whether two prints match. Regardless of whether friction ridge skin is 
unique, examiners make occasional errors in these subjective determinations. 
Consequently, examiners and lawyers should be less concerned about appealing to 
uniqueness as some sort of explanation for practical infallibility and more concerned with 
explaining and avoiding real risks of error. 
 Finally, the scientific reports responded to the popular impression that training and 
experience, conventional standards (e.g. the 12 point minimum), institutional 
arrangements (e.g. proficiency testing), accreditation and so on, could substitute for the 
need to validate procedures and maintain vigilance around performance. Consider the 
emphatic response from PCAST:  
 
… neither experience, nor judgment, nor good professional practices (such as certification 
programs and accreditation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and codes of 
ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and reliability. … Similarly, 
an expert’s expression of confidence based on personal professional experience or expressions 
of consensus among practitioners about the accuracy of their field is no substitute for error rates 
estimated from relevant studies. For forensic feature-comparison methods, establishing 
foundational validity based on empirical evidence is thus a sine qua non. Nothing can substitute 
for it.150 
 
C. A couple of caveats 
There are two important points to reinforce. First, ongoing scientific research confirms 
that latent fingerprint evidence is foundationally valid. While there are lingering concerns 
around the way ACE-V is applied in practice, latent fingerprint evidence should be relied 
upon in investigations and prosecutions. The main problems are the continuing failure to 
recognise real threats, especially around the limits of procedures, the lack of standards, 
cognitive bias, and exaggerating the value and accuracy of latent fingerprint evidence. 
Latent fingerprint evidence should be admissible in criminal proceedings provided the 
evidence is disciplined by the results of scientific research – as PCAST and the AAAS 
advise. 
 This leads onto a second practical issue. The risk of error is lower where there are 
multiple prints and/or independent evidence of guilt – as in Gunn and Wallace. Where 
there are multiple fingerprints, especially where they are attributed to different fingers of 
the same person, the chance of an error will be dramatically reduced. In many cases, 
independent evidence of guilt will suggest that it is unlikely that an error has been made. 
These are ultimately issues for the jury, but it is important that they are explained at trial 
where identity is in issue. A case with one or more fingerprints and independent evidence 
is markedly different from a case relying on a single fingerprint for identification. 
  
 
6. PROACTIVELY DISCLOSING LIMITATIONS AND ERROR 
The contention that fingerprint examiners can unerringly identify persons is inconsistent 
with both scientific studies and the advice of some of the world’s leading collectives of 
scientists. During more than a century of representation and reliance, lawyers and judges 
did not recognise this, along with a number of additional non-trivial limitations with 
fingerprint comparison. Regardless of whether examiners were counting points or using 
ACE-V, and notwithstanding technological developments (such as AFIS), New Zealand’s 
fingerprint examiners equated subjective match decisions with the categorical 
identification of specific individuals. There are no references to limitations in reported 
cases; although Buisson expresses concerns about ‘understatement’ following the 
 
150 PCAST Report, 6. 
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reluctance of examiners to testify in other than categorical terms. Consequently, the most 
ubiquitous forensic science of the twentieth century was invariably exaggerated in ways 
that systematically privileged the Crown. The presentation of latent fingerprint evidence 
as complete evidence of identity shifted responsibility onto defendants – often 
impecunious and dependent on publicly-funded lawyers – to identity and explain 
limitations, including the possibility of a mistake. 
 The apparent failure of trial and appellate processes to identify and convey limitations, 
along with failure of the state’s fingerprint examiners to disclose them, raises serious 
questions about the effectiveness of quotidian trials and appeals.151 While we might be 
inclined to excuse past generations for their credulity and relaxed approach to reliability, 
commitments that now appear partisan effectively insulated the state against the need to 
formally evaluate the many forensic ‘sciences’ in its arsenal.152 It is, however, more 
difficult to excuse the performance of modern fingerprint examiners. They changed their 
‘method’ in response to scientific criticism from the mid 1990s but without disclosing the 
reasons to prosecutors or the courts.153 All contemporary fingerprint examiners are aware 
of the scientific reviews and validation studies discussed in Section 5, but they have yet 
to bring them to the attention of courts. They are yet to modify their reports and opinions 
in ways that incorporate mainstream scientific research and advice. Is this what we expect 
of state-employed experts with a responsibility to ‘assist the Court impartially’? 
 Similarly, modern prosecutors and defence lawyers have not effectively drawn 
attention to epistemological issues; specifically, the need to recalibrate how latent 
fingerprint evidence is presented and, where contested, explained.154 Judges have also 
contributed to this state of affairs by allowing and even endorsing categorical 
identification and expecting defendants to identify actual mistakes.155 Such expectations 
are unrealistic for two main reasons. First, because fingerprint evidence was, and is, 
treated and understood as practically infallible. Secondly, even if an examiner did make a 
mistake, in the vast majority of cases it would be exceedingly difficult for a defendant to 
expose it (let alone persuade a decision-maker). How is a defendant supposed to expose, 
as mistaken, perceptions and interpretations that take place inside an examiner’s head?156 
Apart from cases where there is independent evidence of non-guilt – cases that are 
unlikely to make it to trial – how does a defendant demonstrate that the wrong person has 
been identified?157  
 Fortuitously, recent studies provide means of addressing the problem of systematic 
overstatement. Scientific research confirms the validity and reliability of the basic 
approach. With this in mind, we are at the point to consider how latent fingerprint 
evidence ought to be presented in reports and testimony (regardless of whether it is 
 
151 See generally, Gary Edmond and Mehera San Roque, ‘The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty of 
the Criminal Trial’ (2012) 24 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51; Gary Edmond, Emma Cunliffe, Kristy 
Martire and Mehera San Roque, ‘Forensic science and the limits of cross-examination’ (2019) 42 Melbourne 
University Law Review 858. 
152 Some comparison processes, such as glass, DNA, blood and various chemical assays were validated.  It is also 
important to recognise that historically reliability was not an admissibility criterion and judges were inclined to leave 
issues of reliability to the jury. See, e.g. R v Buisson [1989] 2 NZLR 370, 371. 
153 Any implications for past convictions were thereby not considered. 
154 Gary Edmond, ‘Expert Evidence and the Professional Responsibilities of Prosecutors’ in P. Roberts et al (eds), 
Integrity in the Criminal Process (Oxford, Hart, 2015). See also Edmond, ‘Fingerprint evidence in New Zealand’s 
courts: A history of legal challenges’. 
155 Directions on fingerprint evidence are at best perfunctory; and frequently misguided and misleading. 
156 Agreement between examiners may not be an appropriate solution. Consider the consensus around mistaken 
decisions in Mayfield and McKie, above n 118. 
157 Technically, they only need to raise a doubt. The expectation that the defence will expose foundational issues and 
overstatement is inconsistent with the burdens on prosecutors and expert witnesses not to overstate the value of 
evidence and to present expert evidence in a manner susceptible to rational evaluation. See e.g. Davie v Magistrates of 
Edinburgh 1953 SC 34, 39-40. 
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contested). PCAST provides a useful model. According to the President’s Council, where 
latent fingerprint evidence is adduced: 
 
… it would be appropriate to inform jurors that (1) only two properly designed studies of the 
accuracy of latent fingerprint analysis have been conducted and (2) these studies found false positive 
rates that could be as high as 1 in 306 in one study and 1 in 18 in the other study. This would 
appropriately inform jurors that errors occur at detectable frequencies, allowing them to weigh the 
probative value of the evidence.158 
  
This approach qualifies match decisions – i.e. the claim to have identified a specific 
individual – from a single fingerprint based on what is known about human 
performance.159 The identification is qualified by incorporating the best estimate of 
performance based on currently available studies.160 It renders the opinion susceptible to 
comprehension and rational evaluation.161 Decision-makers are provided with 
information about performance and accuracy rather than having to rely on experience, 
confidence and popular (mis-)conceptions.162  
 Scientists tested fingerprint examiners from the US (e.g. Ullery et al) and Australia 
(e.g. Tangen et al) with fingerprints resembling the kinds of prints they examine in 
routine casework.163 There are differences between these studies and casework but it is 
unclear whether they matter.164 Regardless, we should not persist with overstatement that 
is inconsistent with all of the mainstream scientific advice in the absence of jurisdiction-
specific research – i.e. because New Zealand’s examiners have yet to be rigorously 
tested. We should not persist with overstatement on the speculative basis that New 
Zealand’s fingerprint examiners might turn out to be better than examiners employed by 
the FBI and police agencies in Australia. This would be to perpetuate exaggeration and 
place upon the defence a burden that is inconsistent with our accusatorial tradition.165 For 
the defence is never in a position to formally test forensic science procedures.166 Rather, 
the state must evaluate procedures and present the results ‘warts and all’. The state should 
use the best scientifically-derived evidence available and, where appropriate, disclose 
issues that bear upon accuracy.167 There may be technical debates around how to measure 
and represent error, particularly for criminal justice audiences. There is no simple answer 
here.168 The essential point is to make a good faith attempt to capture and convey the 
 
158 PCAST report, 96. 
159 Victoria Police disclose indicative error rates in their reports. See Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire and Mehera 
San Roque, ‘Expert Reports in the Forensic Sciences’ (2017) 40 UNSW Law Journal 590. 
160 Error rates may change, particularly if institutions endeavour to use the scientific research to improve performance. 
161 Gary Edmond, ‘Forensic science evidence and the conditions for rational (jury) evaluation’ (2015) 
39 Melbourne University Law Review 75. 
162 See the discussion in Edmond et al, ‘Expert Reports in the Forensic Sciences’; Gary Edmond, Matthew 
Thompson and Jason Tangen, ‘A guide to interpreting forensic testimony: Scientific approaches to fingerprint 
evidence’ (2013) 13 Law, Probability & Risk 1–25. 
163 Neither study incorporated a ‘verification’ stage. Consequently the precise value of verification, particularly non-
blind verification remains uncertain. Similarly, there was no peer review and examiners knew they were engaged in 
important studies with the potential to inform how their evidence would be presented (in courts). See Ballantyne et al, 
‘Peer review’. 
164 Differences might be raised on the voir dire or during trial, but in the absence of empirical evidence 
prosecutors and courts should be reluctant to assume that procedures such as non-blind verification eliminate 
errors. 
165 David Faigman, John Monahan and Christopher Slobogin, ‘Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific 
Expert Testimony’ (2014) 81(2) University of Chicago Law Review 417. 
166 Merely raising the failure to validate is unlikely to make a difference. Though, this approach was proposed by 
the English Court of Appeal in R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876. 
167 The quantity and quality of the image and blind verification, for example. 
168 See e.g. Kristy Martire et al, ‘The expression and interpretation of uncertain forensic science evidence: verbal 
equivalence, evidence strength, and the weak evidence effect’ (2013) 37 Law and Human Behavior 197, and more 
generally, Gerd Gigerenzer et al, ‘“A 30% chance of rain tomorrow”: how does the public understand 
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known value of the evidence. In the absence of reliable information about New Zealand’s 
examiners we should draw upon the best available evidence of performance based on 
examiner’s using similar methods – as PCAST recommends.169 
 We can obtain some idea about how this might operate at trial by revisiting the facts of 
Carter – see Section 4.B. Carter was convicted for attempting to manufacture 
methamphetamine. The case against him included: preparatory chemicals and apparatus 
located at a domestic residence; a vehicle registered in his wife’s name parked outside 
that residence; his appearance in a nearby street in the early hours of the morning; his 
flight from the scene when approached by police; his capture in possession of 
ammunition similar to that recovered inside the residence; and a latent fingerprint on a 
‘recipe’ in the residence used to categorically identify him. Carter’s counsel challenged 
the admissibility of some of this evidence, particularly the fingerprint match given the 
absence of reasons.  
 We now know that the examiner’s opinion should not have been presented in 
categorical terms or described as practically infallible. To be clear, latent fingerprint 
evidence should be admissible provided the opinion is supplemented with an indication 
of error.170 The fingerprint examiner (or some scientifically-sophisticated witness) should 
explain that fingerprint evidence is opinion and that when formally tested in controlled 
conditions fingerprint examiners make false positive errors – i.e. mis-identifications – in 
about 1 in 306 decisions.171 
 Presenting latent fingerprint evidence in a manner consistent with the best available 
scientific advice would not threaten the vast majority of prosecutions and convictions but 
would make trials fairer and improve the accuracy of decision-making. If the fingerprint 
evidence had been presented with an indicative error rate the likelihood of convicting 
Carter remains high. For, when evaluating the case against Carter, the jury were expected 
to consider all of the admissible evidence. The real possibility of a mistake in the 
identification might be confidently discounted when the fingerprint evidence is 
considered in conjunction with the other evidence.172 The risk of error – of Carter being 
mis-identified given the other circumstantial evidence – is very low.173 In this 
scientifically-inflected form the fingerprint evidence remains probative and the case 
compelling. 
 Critics might dismiss the insights in this article as trivial. I can imagine a few 
contending that (almost) every case considered was appropriately decided. Or, that at 
most, all I have achieved is to locate a small oversight in the way fingerprint evidence has 
been expressed that has emerged in recent years. There are several points to make here. 
First, as the NRC, NIST, PCAST and AAAS reports make clear, there is a big difference 
 
probabilistic weather forecasts?’ (2005) 25 Risk Analysis 623. 
169 It would, however, be a mistake to rely on current proficiency testing. The President of Collaborative Testing 
Services, one of the major commercial providers recently explained that, ‘[e]asy tests are favoured by the [forensic 
science] community’, see PCAST report, 57, 68. These tests seem to be designed to facilitate compliance with 
regulatory frameworks (e.g. accreditation) and may not reveal much about abilities or accuracy. Such revelation, along 
with a history of selective disclosure and omission, reinforce the need to have independent scientists involved in 
designing and conducting rigorous studies. 
170 See also See Jonathan Koehler, ‘Fingerprint error rates and proficiency tests: What they are and why they 
matter’ (2008) 59 Hastings Law Journal 1077 and ‘Proficiency tests to estimate error rates in the forensic 
sciences’ (2013) 12 Law, Probability and Risk 89. 
171 Alternatively, they might also use the 1 in 604 figure from Table 1. Less turns on the figure than acknowledging the 
reality of error and providing a good faith estimate based on rigorous empirical studies. Empirically-based reasons for 
preferring different error rates might be raised. This is preferable to leaving the issue for the defendant and defence 
counsel. 
172 Especially where examiners are not engaged in suggestive procedures and are blinded from gratuitous information 
about the investigation. 
173 This assumes that the fingerprint comparison was independent of the other evidence. 
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between an infallible identification and a match decision that assists with identification 
but where empirical studies have found examiners make errors somewhere between 1 in 
18 and 1 in 306 comparisons. Secondly, this oversight has yet to be addressed or even 
conceded. Thirdly, in most trials and appeals we do not know the correct decision 
regarding identification or guilt. Consequently, we should be cautious when invoking 
claims about putatively correct trial outcomes to support the use or accuracy of a forensic 
science procedure (or the effectiveness of our system of trials and appeals). This is why 
the rigorous independent testing of forensic science procedures is essential. So we can 
determine whether they work and how well.174 Relying on case outcomes is tautological 
and introduces a real risk of self-deception – especially by those committed to our current 
system of trials and appeals or the reliability of specific types of expert opinion.  
 It is likely that fingerprint evidence will eventually be presented in a statistical form, 
probably as a likelihood ratio generated by one or more algorithms. When it does we will 
expect the algorithms to have been formally validated and to produce ‘outputs’ that are 
consistent with the known accuracy of the system (based on ground truth testing). That is, 
similar to the way DNA evidence is routinely presented. However, we do not have to wait 
for the perfection of future technologies before we require latent fingerprint examiners to 
present their opinions in a scientifically defensible form.175 After a century of systematic 
exaggeration it is time for the state to present one of its most powerful forensic sciences 
in a manner that embodies the known abilities of examiners, and in a way that does not 
deprive defendants of the real possibility of error. 
 Categorical identification and infallibility claims are best left to the pre-scientific past. 
There are no principled legal reasons for not accepting mainstream scientific advice and 
requiring fingerprint examiners to present their undoubtedly expert opinions more 
modestly. 
 
174 In most cases testing includes the examiner, who is unavoidably implicated in the procedure – as in ACE-V. 
175 Some of these algorithms are in limited use. The US military, for example, has developed an algorithm that 
presents fingerprint evidence in a statistical form. Queensland Police have recently introduced an algorithm for 
identifying prints that are not questioned. 
